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Abstract
I introduce taste-based discrimination in a trade model with imperfect competition
and provide an explanation for the heterogeneous effects of international trade on
the gender wage gap within sectors. Firms operate in an oligopoly where prejudiced
employers can use their rents to pay men a premium in line with Becker’s theory. On
one hand, import competition reduces local rents and with them the average gender
wage gap in sectors that were sheltered from competition prior to trade liberalization.
On the other hand, easier access to foreign markets can increase domestic firms’ profits
and enable discriminatory firms to maintain wage gaps. Evidence from the Uruguayan
trade liberalisation supports the empirical relevance of the taste-based discrimination
mechanism at the sectoral level.
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1 Introduction
Research on the labour market effects of international trade finds increased wage in-
equality, not only between different skill groups but also among workers with similar observ-
able skills. In this paper, I investigate the effects of international trade on wage differences
between men and women, controlling for observable skills, in a framework with firm hetero-
geneity and taste-based discrimination. I show that when there is imperfect competition
in the product market, taste-based discrimination provides a consistent explanation of the
varied impact of trade openness on the gender wage gap within sectors. Becker’s theory
of employer discrimination suggests that, in sectors with rents, the prejudice of some em-
ployers can produce a wage gap between equally-productive men and women due to the
unequal sharing of production revenues across groups. In such sectors, greater competition
puts downward pressure on the wage gap, and ultimately no wage discrimination should
pertain as firms’ profits tend to zero. Hence trade liberalisation should help to drive out
wage discrimination via foreign competition. Yet, empirical research has also found a pos-
itive association between export shares and the gender wage gap in concentrated sectors.1
I argue that the effect of trade on the wage gap is more complex than its simple identifi-
cation with tougher competition in Becker’s theory. Trade has not only a pro-competitive
effect but also a market-size effect that impacts positively profits and thus the ability to
discriminate.
The first contribution here is to provide an explicit trade model under imperfect com-
petition where both trade patterns and the gender wage gap are endogenous. I can then
derive the conditions under which trade openness curbs wage discrimination. There is a
single international oligopoly à la Cournot, where two countries produce and trade a ho-
mogeneous good. Firm output decisions and export opportunities are determined by their
1Berik et al. (2004), Menon and Rodgers (2009).
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relative costs of production, which in turn depend on the firm’s position in the distribution
of prejudice over all incumbents. Oligopolists are sensitive to the gender-composition of
their workforce, as in Becker (1957). To hire male workers, prejudiced employers use their
rents and offer men a wage premium. Different levels of prejudice against women thus lead
to heterogeneity in firm’s labour costs. In this partial-equilibrium model with an oligop-
sonistic labour market, even a small number of discriminatory employers can generate a
gender wage gap.
The pro-competitive impact of international trade on discrimination results from the
selection of the most-competitive (least-discriminatory) firms. As discrimination is costly,
discriminatory firms are less productive than non-discriminatory firms. Discriminatory
firms can afford their labour cost disadvantage in markets sheltered from competition, but
higher import penetration spurs discriminatory firms to align their costs to those of non-
discriminatory firms. As a result, demand for male labour dwindles while that for female
labour increases, reducing the wage gap.
The role of market-size for wage discrimination in a Beckerian setting is a novel finding
of this paper. Trade integration offers new sales opportunities abroad and the selection of
firms into the foreign market determines the effect on the gender wage gap. If only most-
competitive (least-discriminatory) firms are able to export, the gender wage is reduced
with better access to foreign markets. If discriminatory firms are also able to export and
earn profits abroad, there is no selection effect and trade openness results in a widening
of the wage gap in the domestic country. The latter scenario requires that the domestic
country has a considerable competitive advantage over the foreign country, and that the
number of domestic firms is not too high.
The second contribution of the work here is to test these theoretical predictions using
a novel empirical strategy. In most of the work on the impact of trade openness on the
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gender wage gap, foreign competition is captured by import penetration.2 However, import
penetration alone may not be the best measure. First, higher import penetration does not
necessarily reduce rents if export profit opportunities are high enough. Second, import
penetration can increase either because imports rise or domestic production falls; in the
latter case, changing domestic market conditions can mislead us into thinking that foreign
competition has become sharper. Some authors have also regressed the wage gap on export
shares3 or a measure of global openness combining both imports and exports. Even if it is
true that more competitive firms are better at exporting, it does not necessarily hold that
higher export shares reflect tougher competition for domestic firms. As for global openness,
this variable does not allow us to disentangle the wage effect of import penetration from
that of export orientation. To partly deal with these issues, one should control for both
sector specific import and export shares in the same regression. But in fact, the theory
suggests another empirical approach: the size of the sectoral gender wage gap does not
depend primarily on trade volumes but rather on market access, as defined in economic
geography models.4 The model presented in this paper differs from standard economic
geography models as it features restricted entry of firms and because the labour market is
not fully competitive. However, market access influences firms’ profits, and thus firm ability
to discriminate, in the same way. Both the access to foreign markets (export potential) and
the access to the domestic market by foreign firms (import potential) are used to disentangle
the market-size and the pro-competitive effects of trade openness on the gender wage gap.
I use data from Uruguay, which dramatically opened its economy to international trade
with the creation of a common market agreement, the Mercosur, in the 1990s. Over
2See Artecona and Cunningham (2002), Berik et al. (2004), Black and Brainerd (2004), Menon and
Rodgers (2009).
3Berik et al. (2004), Menon and Rodgers (2009).
4See Fujita et al. (1999), who first presented the “New Economic Geography wage equation” where the
wages paid by a firm in a given region depend on regional access to other markets.
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this period, gender prejudices on labour market access and pay remained frequent among
employers. According to the World Value Survey, in 1996, 49% of male mangers agreed
that “when jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women” and 38%
of them agreed that “if a woman earns more money than her husband, it’s almost certain
to cause problems”. I first estimate the part of the gender wage gap due to different male
and female returns to observable characteristics using individual data from the household
survey Encuesta Continua de Hogares. The gender wage gaps are estimated for each sector
and year between 1983 and 2003. I then estimate measures of market potentials for each
sector and year with a gravity equation using bilateral trade data and information on trade
costs. In the model, the effect of trade integration depends on the number of domestic firms
operating in the sector. I interact the market access variables with a measure of production
concentration at the sector level and investigate how the effect of trade differs depending on
the initial level of domestic competition in a sector. I find evidence of the pro-competitive
effect of trade. Greater market penetration by foreign competitors in a concentrated sector
reduces the sectoral gender wage gap. Better access to foreign markets also reduces the
gender wage gap in sectors that were already competitive (had a low concentration level)
prior trade liberalisation. This is consistent with the selection of least discriminatory firms
into export markets in sectors with a high number of firms. However, I also find evidence
of the market-size or profit-enhancing effect of trade integration in concentrated sectors.
Concentrated sectors that gain easier access to foreign markets exhibit a rising gender wage
gap.
The work here is related to two strands of literature. It contributes first to the literature
on competition and gender inequality (Black and Strahan, 2001; Hellerstein and Neumark,
2006; Heyman et al., 2013; Weber and Zulehner, 2014) and second to the literature on
international trade and gender inequality (Ederington et al., 2009; Ben Yahmed, 2012;
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Sauré and Zoabi, 2014; Juhn et al., 2014). I focus on the impact of international trade
on the gender wage gap through changes in competition level (Black and Brainerd, 2004)
and investigate not only the impact of greater import penetration but also the impact of
greater export potential. Both the theory and the empirics show that both channels matter
for gender wage inequality.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In the next section I develop a
model of oligopolistic competition and wage discrimination in a closed economy. Section 3
features the open-economy version. In section 4 I describe the empirical methodology, the
data and descriptive statistics on gender gaps and trade in Uruguay over the 1990s. The
empirical results are presented in Section 5. Last, Section 6 concludes.
2 Oligopolistic competition and discrimination in a closed
economy
2.1 The model
The implication of firm concentration and costly trade on the sector specific gender
wage gap can be brought out in a partial equilibrium analysis. I consider a single industry
with restricted entry and oligopolistic competition. I assume that there are an exogenous
fixed number N of potential firms that can produce the same homogeneous good 5.
Demand
The inverse demand function is linear and the price depends positively on the size of
5This approach is adopted in Chapter 5 of Helpman and Krugman (1987); potential explanations for
the absence of free entry are stringent market regulations or start-up costs acting as a deterrent.
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demand b6 and falls with the aggregate level of production Q in the market:
p = b−Q = b−
N∑
i=1
qi (1)
A linear demand function easily captures the downward pressure on prices and mark-
ups due to tougher competition (more firms serving the market), and thus highlights the
effect of competition on employers’ ability to discriminate.
Production
Firms, indexed by i, are ex ante heterogeneous in the employer’s prejudice against women
di ∈ [0; d¯], and the distribution of prejudice is exogenously given. The equilibrium wage
gap d∗, however, is endogenous and ultimately determines the type of worker a firm hires
along with its wage bill. The ex post distribution of firms’ outcomes, e.g. marginal cost
and production, is thus endogenous.
Labour is the only factor of production and is inelastically supplied at the sectoral
level L¯. Male and female labour supplies are denoted by L¯m and L¯f , neither of which is
influenced by the level of discrimination. Firms’ technologies are identical and represented
by a linear production function
qi = lif + lim
where male lm and female labour lf are perfect substitutes. The cost function features
constant returns to scale once the firm operates in the market: C(qi) = ciqi where ci is
firm i’s unit cost of production. Employers not only take into account the wages paid to
6Consumer demand for goods is not related to household wealth, workers’ wages or entrepreneurs’
profits. Not incorporating income effects is plausible as individuals working in one sector consume only a
small fraction of the good they produce, so that demand is not much affected by their income.
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employees but also their personal distastes for certain types of workers. Employer i will
hire women if the gender wage gap compensates the utility loss, i.e. wf + di < wm. The
perceived unit labour cost is given by:
ci =
 wf + di if firm i employs womenwm if firm i employs men
This setting leads to complete gender segregation across firms.7
2.2 The firm’s output decision
The setting is a standard one-stage game in which N firms compete in quantity. The
price p depends on the production of all incumbent firms, and firm i takes the output of
other firms as given while maximizing its profits adjusted for discriminatory preferences.8
The firm’s maximization problem is as follows, where the objective function is concave in
qi:
max
qi
pii = qi
p(qi,∑
j 6=i
qj)− ci

Firms are wage-takers, and choose the quantity produced, i.e. the number of workers they
hire. The first-order conditions for the N different firms can be written as:
qi = p− ci ∀i = 1, ..., N (2)
7Alternatively, I could use Arrow’s (1973) version of taste-based discrimination theory where employers’
satisfaction depends on the share of women in firm employment instead of the absolute number of women.
This setting would generate mixed firms which is a more realistic feature. The quantitative results of the
model, however, are not affected by the specification choice. From here on, I denote "‘female firms"’ the
firms that employ women, while "‘male firms"’ are those that employ men.
8Employer i maximises a utility function equal to profits minus the monetary value of the disutility of
employing women. Employer i removes di × lf which corresponds to the utility loss from employing lf
women.
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Among the N firms, Nf firms hire women at a perceived cost of cif = wf + di and Nm
firms hire men at an identical cost of cm = wm. There are thus Nf + 1 equations for firm
output. The number of workers firms hire falls with an increase in their specific costs ci.
As wf + di ≤ wm for all i, female firms have lower costs and hence produce more than do
male firms. Among female firms, those with lower levels of prejudice employ more women
and produce more.
Firms’ reaction functions
Substituting the value of p given by the demand function (1) into the first-order condition
gives us the reaction function of each firm: qi = 12(b−Q−i−ci) where Q−i is the sum of pro-
duction from all firms except firm i and can be expressed as Q−i = (N−1)(qi+ci)−∑j 6=i cj
using the N first order conditions. Substituting this expression for Q−i, the firm reaction
function can be written as a function of the average cost of its competitors c˜−i and its own
cost ci only.9
qi =
b− ci + (N − 1)(c˜−i − ci)
N + 1 (3)
Equations (1) and (2) can be combined to express the price of the homogeneous good
as:
p = N
N + 1
(
b
N
+ C(Q,N)
N
)
(4)
where C(Q,N) = ∑Ni ci is the sum of production costs over all operating firms. The
pro-competitive effect of market size N that transits via market fragmentation and the fall
9Note that since firms are heterogeneous in their unit costs, I need to check whether all of them produce
in equilibrium. This yields conditions on the size of demand b and the number of operating firms N , which
are exogenously fixed. Appendix A sets out the conditions ensuring an interior solution.
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in competitors’ average unit costs. The price is positively related to demand bN , which
explains why firms thrive by penetrating new markets.
2.3 The marginal discriminator
The equilibrium gender wage gap is determined by the level of prejudice of the last
firm which hires women Nf , which is called the marginal firm. Nf is the only firm to be
indifferent between employing men and women:
wf + d∗ = wm with d∗ ∈ [dNf ; dNf+1 [ (5)
There is a continuum of equilibrium gender wage gaps comprised between the prejudice
of the marginal employer dNf and the prejudice of the next firm dNf+1 . In order to simplify
some of the ensuing analysis, I use a particular parametrization of this distribution among
employers. In particular, I assume that the actual prejudice of incumbents has a discrete
uniform distribution over the interval [0; d¯]. The difference in prejudice between two firms
is di − di+1 = d¯N−1 and the gender wage gap is:
d∗ = (Nf − 1) d¯
N − 1 + ν with ν ∈ [0 ;
d¯
N − 1[
Note that this general case d∗ = dNf + ν can be reasonably reduced to d∗ = dNf +  as
all firms i with di > dNf can hire men by setting a wage just above that which renders the
previous firm indifferent between men and women. Without loss of generality, the wage
gap can thus be expressed as:
d∗ = (Nf − 1) d¯
N − 1 (6)
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Firms’ perceived costs can now be written as:
ci =
 wm − (d
∗ − di) if di ≤ d∗ so that firm i employs women
wm if di > d∗ so that firm i employs men
The marginal firm may possibly have a mixed labour force. The analysis below con-
siders the case where the Nf firms exactly absorb female labour supply so that there are
no mixed firms. This hypothesis does not alter the results of the model and facilitates the
resolution of the labour-market clearing conditions.
2.4 Labour-market equilibrium
The wages of both men and women adjust until full employment is reached. The
demand for female (male) labour is a function of the total output of the female (male)
firms. Using the first-order condition, the labour-market clearing conditions can be written
as:
L¯f =
Nf∑
1
p− (wf + di) and L¯m =
N∑
Nf+1
p− wm
The sum of the utility loss faced by discriminatory employers of female firms is, under
the assumption that the distribution of d is discrete uniform over [0; d¯], an arithmetic series:∑Nf
1 di =
∑Nf
i=1 di =
Nf (Nf−1)
N−1
d¯
2
Using the labour-market clearing conditions, the equilibrium wages wf and wm and
wage gap are:
wf = p− Nf − 1
N − 1
d¯
2 −
L¯f
Nf
(7)
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wm = p− L¯m
Nm
(8)
d∗ = L¯f
Nf
− L¯m
Nm
+ Nf − 1
N − 1
d¯
2 (9)
Having previously defined d∗ as a function of Nf in equation (6), I can implicitly define
d∗:
d∗ = 2d¯
(
L¯f
d¯+ (N − 1)d∗ −
L¯m
(N − 1)(d¯− d∗)
)
The proofs of the existence and uniqueness of d∗ appear in the Appendix.
We recapitulate below the equations that define the equilibrium in the economy:
wf = p− Nf−1N−1 d¯2 −
L¯f
Nf
wm = p− L¯mNm
d∗ = wm − wf
Nf = 1 + d
∗
d¯
(N − 1)
p = NN+1
(
b+ wm − NfN
(
Nf−1
N−1
d¯
2
))
qim = p− wm
qif = p− (wf + di)
The first two equations give the wages of women and men as a function of the price, the
total number of firms in the sector and the number of female firms, while the third equa-
tion defines the wage gap. The fourth equation shows the number of female firms, which
depends on the distribution of prejudice across firms d¯N−1 and the wage gap. The price is
determined by the size of demand and average firm unit costs, as given by the fifth equa-
tion. The last two equations define firm output levels, which depend on their perceived
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unit costs. The output of female firms depends on their d, while all male firms produce
the same amount as they have the same perceived cost of production, wm.
Evolution of the wage gap
The standard predictions from the Beckerian model can be derived by applying the implicit
function theorem to Φ, which is defined as:
Φ ≡ d∗ − 2d¯
(
L¯f
d¯+ (N − 1)d∗ −
L¯m
(N − 1)(d¯− d∗)
)
= 0
First, for a given number of firms, the wage gap expands as more women enter the
labour market, ∂d∗
∂L¯f
> 0. More firms hire women so that the marginal employer has
stronger prejudice and requires a wider wage differential to hire female employees. As
expected, the opposite holds as male labour supply rises, ∂d∗
∂L¯m
< 0.
Moreover, it follows that d∗ falls with N , ∂d∗∂N < 0. Suppose the range of prejudice does
not widen, then a rise in the number of firms, uniformly distributed in the segment [0; d],
has two opposite effects. On the one hand, the difference in prejudice between two firms
d
N−1 is reduced. Keeping Nf constant, this reduces the wage gap as the last firm employing
women, the marginal discriminator, now has lower prejudice than before the entry of new
firms. On the other hand, an increase in N reduces the level of output produced by each
firm. The full employment of women requires a higher number of firms. Higher Nf corre-
sponds to a higher level of prejudice for the marginal discriminator and thus a larger wage
gap. The reason why the first effect dominates is as follows. Less-discriminatory firms
have lower unit costs, so their market share falls less than that of more discriminatory
firms after new firm entry. The demand for female workers increases relative to that for
male workers with firm entry, and the wage gap is reduced. This effect highlights the role
of the number of firms in reducing the incidence of taste-based discrimination.
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Selection effect
Another way of formalizing the effect of market structure on employers’ ability to discrim-
inate is to calculate the cost threshold above which discriminatory firms cannot produce.
Let c¯ be the maximal unit cost above which a firm stops producing. The solution to the
zero-operating profit condition c¯ = p(c¯) defines the cost cut-off as follows:
c¯ = b−
(
V 2
d¯
(N − 1) + V
)
(10)
where V =
dNf
2 is the average perceived-cost difference between female and male firms.
In other words, V is the perceived cost disadvantage of discriminatory firms. Tougher
competition, in the sense of more firms producing, reduces the cost threshold above which
no firms can produce: ∂c¯∂N < 0. The pro-competitive effect is more pronounced when the
number of producers is initially small ∂2c¯
∂N2 < 0. Furthermore,
∂2c¯
∂N∂d¯
> 0 shows that the
impact of an increase in N on the wage gap is stronger when the dispersion of prejudice is
wider. The “disciplinary effect” of competition is more pronounced in sectors where there
are stronger stereotypes against women.
3 The Open Economy
3.1 Import penetration, export opportunities and discrimination
This section considers the case where two countries D and F (for the domestic and
foreign country) trade a homogeneous good under oligopolistic competition. Firms in both
countries engage in intra-industry trade to capture some of the rents that exist in the
foreign market. Brander (1981) first formalised how strategic interactions among Cournot
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oligopolists in two countries lead to intra-industry trade.10 The country characteristics
may differ. Domestic and foreign consumers’ inverse demand functions are respectively
pD = bD −QD (1a-T)
pF = bF −QF (1b-T)
There are NF foreign firms which are assumed to be homogeneous, so that all firms in
F produce at the same unit cost of cF .11 The markets are segmented, although firms can
export by incurring a transport cost. Foreign firms have to pay an iceberg trade cost τD
to sell in market D while domestic firms have to pay τF to export to market F 12. As firms
produce under constant returns to scale, they maximise separately the profits (adjusted for
their preferences) that they make on the domestic and foreign markets taking as given the
production of other domestic firms that export qDF , and the production of foreign firms
qF .
max piiDF = qiDF × (pF (qDF , qF )− ciτF )
where qiDF are the sales of domestic firm i in market F , qDF are the sales of other domestic
firms in market F and qF are the sales of foreign firms in market F . Optimal sales in market
10This type of model was subsequently used and developed by Combes et al. (1997), Neary (2002) and
Neary (2003), among others.
11I abstract from heterogeneity in costs among foreign firms, and in particular from differences due to
discrimination. This assumption has no implications for the determinants of the wage gap in the domestic
country, as what matters for discriminators to be able to sell are the final equilibrium prices in the domestic
and foreign markets.
12Iceberg trade costs were used by Brander (1981) in an oligopolistic-competition context. Alternatively,
if the transport cost is additive, the first-order conditions become: qiDF = pF − wf − di − τF and qiDF =
pF −wf − d∗ − τF . A unit trade cost would no longer enter the cost difference between discriminatory and
non-discriminatory exporting firms. Consequently, as we will see later, trade liberalization no longer affects
the wage gap via the intensive margin (the volume of exports) but the results for the effect of trade via the
extensive margin (the type of firms which export) remain unchanged.
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F for firm i are given by:
pF + qipF (qi, qj) ≤ ciτF
Production for each market is then:
qiDD =
 pD − (wf + di) if di ≤ d
∗
pD − (wf + d∗) if di > d∗
qiDF =
 pF − (wf + di)τF if di ≤ d
∗
pF − (wf + d∗)τF if di > d∗
Domestic sales and exports of firm i are:
qiDD =
b− ciDD + (ND +NDf − 1)(c˜−iD − ciDD)
ND +NDf + 1
(2a-T)
qiDF =
bF − ciDF τF + (ND +NDf − 1)(c˜−iF − ciDF τF )
ND +NDf + 1
(2b-T)
with c˜−ih being the average unit cost of both domestic and foreign competitors selling in
market h. ND is the number of domestic firms and NDf is the number of domestic female
firms. The conditions for output to be positive in both markets for a firm of type i are
derived in Appendix A.2.
3.2 The labour market
The wage gap is defined as under autarky by equations (5) and (6). Using the assump-
tion that the distribution of d is discrete uniform over [0; d¯] to substitute for ∑i di, the
labour-market clearing conditions for women and men in the open-economy case are given
by:
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L¯f =
d∗∑
i=0
qiDD + qiDF = NDf
(
pD + pF − (1 + τF )
(
wf +
NDf − 1
ND − 1
d¯
2
))
L¯m =
d¯∑
i=d∗+r
qiDD + qiDF = NDm(pD + pF − wm(1 + τF ))
where NDf is the number of domestic female firms and NDm the number of domestic male
firms. The equilibrium wages and the wage gap under trade are:
wf =
1
1 + τF
(pD + pF − L¯f
NDf
)− NDf − 1
ND − 1
d¯
2 (6-T)
wm =
1
1 + τF
(pD + pF − L¯m
NDm
) (7-T)
d∗ = 2d¯1 + τF
(
L¯f
d¯+ (ND − 1)d∗
− L¯m
(ND − 1)(d¯− d∗)
)
(8-T)
The proofs of the existence and uniqueness of d∗ appear in the Appendix.
Defining ΦT ≡ d∗ − 2d¯1+τF
(
L¯f
d¯+(ND−1)d∗ −
L¯m
(ND−1)(d¯−d∗)
)
= 0 , and applying the implicit
function theorem, simple comparative statics show that:
∂d∗
∂τF
= −
∂ΦT
∂τF
∂ΦT
∂d∗
< 0
In a sector with discriminatory firms, and holding the number of producing firms con-
stant, a fall in export costs τF further increases the gender wage gap. With trade liber-
alization and the fall in export barriers τF , the wage gap in the domestic labour market
increases because discriminatory (higher-cost) firms benefit from new sales opportunities
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which increase their ability to discriminate. This result is in line with Becker’s model re-
garding the role of competition, and stems from the fact that trade openness may reduce
or increase firm profits: in some circumstances, even higher-cost firms can benefit from
new profit opportunities in foreign markets. Previous work had assumed that openness in-
creases competition, and overlooked the fact that by facilitating access to foreign markets
it may also raise profitability. Note that this effect applies to a concentrated sector where
the number of firms is low enough so that firms enjoy rents and are able to discriminate
already prior trade liberalization. This exercise keeps the number of producing firms con-
stant. The next subsection looks at the impact of foreign trade costs τF and domestic trade
costs τD on the gender wage gap when higher-cost firms may cease production, keeping the
number of potential firms constant.
3.3 Foreign competition and firm selection
To further understand how foreign competition affects wage discrimination via the se-
lection of firms, I make use of the cost threshold above which a firm cannot sell in a market.
The lower is this cost threshold, the smaller the firms’ profits, and the lower the gender wage
gap. In the open-economy framework, firms face different zero-profit conditions depending
on the market in which they operate. Those conditions define the maximum level of factor
prices the firm can afford in each market. Equation (9a-T) establishes the production-cost
threshold to sell in the domestic market while equation (9b-T) shows that to export to
market F .
The cost threshold at home
Let c¯D denote the cost threshold above which a domestic firm cannot break even in its
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domestic market. This cost threshold is equal to the selling price c¯D = pD.
c¯D =
b−NDfV +NDfcF τD
NDf + 1
(9a-T)
where V is again the average cost disadvantage of male firms compared to all female firms.
The impact of a fall in trade costs τD highlights the competitive effect of trade openness.
When country D reduces its trade barriers, its domestic cost cut-off falls, ∂c¯D∂τD > 0.
Proposition 1. The competition effect of domestic market openness.
In a sector with discriminatory firms, a fall in the costs to enter the domestic market τD
reduces the gender wage gap.
This reflects two different effects. First, foreign firms pay lower trade costs to enter
country D’s market so that the average cost of competitors falls. Second, as foreign firms
sell now at lower cost they are able to sell more, this generates a fragmentation effect. The
cost cut-off also falls with the number of foreign firms exporting to the domestic market,
∂c¯D
∂N < 0. This effect operates through the two channels cited above: the fragmentation
effect, as more firms sell in market D, and an indirect effect as an increase in the number
of incumbent firms exerts downward pressure on average cost. Last, ∂c¯D∂cF > 0. It is obvious
that competition is fiercer when foreign competitors are more productive, i.e. when cF is
low.
The cost threshold abroad
Let c¯DF denote the cost threshold above which a domestic firm does not export to the
foreign market F . Firms cannot compete in market F if their production costs multiplied
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by the iceberg trade costs are greater than the price in market F :
c¯DF =
bF −NDfV τF +NF cF
ND(1− τF ) +NF + 1 (9b-T)
The greater the number of domestic and foreign firms, the lower the cost cut-off: ∂c¯DF∂NF <
0. The lower the unit-cost of foreign firms, the smaller is the cost threshold: ∂c¯DF∂cF > 0. So
that for high enough NF and cF , domestic male firms, that have higher production costs,
are not able to export.
A change in the trade barriers τF has opposing effects on the cost cut-off, as it affects
firms decisions on both production levels for the foreign market (the intensive margin) and
entry into the export market (the extensive margin).
∂c¯DF
∂τF
= ND(bF +NF cF )− (ND +NF + 1)(NDfV )
The first term captures a competition effect of trade liberalisation via the intensive
margin. Reduced export barriers correspond to lower unit costs for exporting firms; as a
result of firms’ strategic interactions in the foreign market, the foreign price falls and so does
the cost threshold for exporting. The second term captures a market-size effect of trade
liberalisation via the entry of firms in the foreign markets, the extensive margin. As lower
trade costs make it easier for firms to break even in the foreign market, new less-productive
firms are now able to export (as in Melitz (2003)). Lower τF raises the cost-threshold. This
effect is proportional to the cost disadvantage of discriminatory firms V . As transport costs
fall, their cost disadvantage represents less of a hindrance to exporting.
The market-size effect dominates when the cost difference between discriminatory and
non-discriminatory firms is large, corresponding to an industry with few firms. The effect of
trade liberalisation on the equilibrium gender wage gap depends on the number of domestic
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firms. Taking the cross-partial derivative, one can show that ∂2c¯DF∂τF ∂ND > 0.
13 When a small
number of firms operate in a sector, trade liberalisation in partner countries offers export
opportunities to discriminatory firms and the gender wage gap widens. However, as the
number of domestic firms increases, the extensive margin effect is offset by that of the
intensive margin. Trade liberalisation in partner countries benefits most lower-cost non-
discriminatory and the selection of firms into exporting contributes to a reduction in the
gender wage gap .
Proposition 2. The competition and market-size effects of foreign market open-
ness.
In a sector with discriminatory firms, a fall in the costs to enter the foreign market τF
i) reduces the gender wage gap if the number domestic of firms is large enough (competition
effect),
ii) increases the gender wage gap if the number domestic of firms is small (market-size
effect).
This is a particularly interesting result, as it emphasises the profit-enhancing effect
of foreign-market access that has been overlooked in previous empirical analysis of the
effect of trade openness on the gender wage gap. To sum up, profit opportunities may
rise with trade. When access to foreign markets becomes easier, if domestic firms have a
significant cost advantage, cD < cF , and the number of domestic competitors is low, export
opportunities benefit both non-discriminatory and discriminatory firms and the latter can
maintain their discriminatory practices. However, if foreign competitors NF produce at
lower cost and put competitive pressure on domestic firms, there is a selection of firms into
exporting. In this case, trade integration favors low-cost non-discriminatory firms over
13This is obtain from ∂
2c¯DF
∂τF ∂ND
= (bF + NF cF ) − (ND + NF + 1)(NDf ∂V∂ND + V
∂NDf
∂ND
) − NDfV with
∂V
∂ND
< 0, ∂NDf
∂ND
< 0 and NDV > NDfV .
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discriminatory firms, reducing the demand for male labour and hence the gender wage
gap.
4 An empirical investigation
The theoretical model sets out the ability to discriminate in imperfectly-competitive
sectors which are opened to trade. I now proceed to test the model’s prediction about the
effect of trade integration on the sectoral gender wage gap with data for Uruguay, a country
which experienced considerable trade liberalisation in the 1990s. In Section 4.1, I estimate
gender wage discrimination at the sectoral level using individual data with information
on industry affiliation. Section 4.2 then presents the domestic competition variable, and
Section 4.3 explains how market access is calculated to obtain a measure of trade openness.
The empirical specification implemented in the last step is described in Section 4.4.
4.1 Calculating the gender wage gaps
4.1.1 Data
I use data from the Uruguayan longitudinal household survey (Encuesta Continua de
Hogares, hereafter ECH) over the 1983-2003 period. The survey covers all urban areas in
the country which represent 87% of the population in the late 1980s, and 92% in 2004.
Given that I am interested in the gender wage gap due to employer discrimination, I restrict
the sample to employees, aged from 18 to 65, excluding unpaid workers, the self-employed
and employers.
Table 1 shows that between 67% and 75% of the working population are employees.
Female employees receive on average lower hourly wages than male employees although
the raw gender wage gap has decreased over the period. The following analysis focuses
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on employees in the manufacturing sector as it is the most exposed to international trade.
It represents between 22.5% and 11.7% of all employees over the 1990s. Men have higher
employment shares in the manufacturing sectors compared to women. The bottom panel
of Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on the sample of employees in the manufacturing
sector. Female employees in the manufacturing sector earn less than men and the gender
wage gap is higher in the manufacturing sector than in the overall economy. There is a slow
convergence between male and female average wages in the manufacturing sector. While
the raw wage gap was 0.4 log points in 1990, it declined to 0.27 log points in 2002. Female
employees are slightly younger than male employees but the difference has faded out over
the period. However, women have on average a higher level of education than men and the
difference has even increased over time. There has been an increase in the educational level
for both men and women but the increase in the share of employees with some tertiary
education has been stronger for females than for males.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics from the household survey
Gender 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Share of employees in Male 66.9 67.8 66.4 64.9 65.8 65.4 65.1
the working population Female 69.2 68.3 68.0 69.2 70.9 72.3 75.1
Mean real hourly wage Male 2.96 3.04 3.13 3.11 3.15 3.20 2.97
(in logarithms) (0.66) (0.70) (0.72) (0.74) (0.73) (0.74) (0.89)
Female 2.73 2.86 2.95 2.96 3.01 3.09 2.93
(0.73) (0.73) (0.75) (0.76) (0.74) (0.74) (0.83 )
[0.6em] Share of employees in Male 25.9 25.1 23.5 20.6 20.2 17.8 15.4
manufacturing Female 17.6 17.4 14 11.3 11 9.8 7.5
Mean real hourly wages Male 2.98 3.11 3.14 3.11 3.12 3.15 2.88
(in logarithms) (0.63) (0.65) (0.66) (0.69) (0.70) (0.71) (0.73)
Female 2.59 2.75 2.78 2.77 2.88 2.92 2.61
(0.73) (0.70) (0.72) (0.72) (0.66) (0.68) (0.77 )
Age Male 36.8 37.0 36.2 36.1 36.8 36.2 37.1
Female 35.7 35.8 35.4 35.8 35.0 36.0 37.9
Level of education
Primary or less Male 40.9 38.4 35.3 32.6 31.9 27.5 26.9
Female 38.4 31.1 32.9 29.1 24.2 22.1 21.3
Secondary Male 32.5 31.4 34.5 35.3 34.8 42.1 42.3
Female 44.0 47.5 44.3 47.1 53.3 52.1 48.9
Technical Male 21.4 23.3 23.5 24.7 25.2 21.8 21.1
Female 9.8 13.8 13.0 13.0 11.6 9.8 12.4
Tertiary Male 5.2 6.8 6.6 7.4 8.1 8.6 9.7
Female 7.8 7.5 9.8 10.7 10.8 16.0 17.4
Number of observations Male 2452 2386 2235 1901 1719 1492 1222
Employees in manufacturing Female 1199 1185 976 828 756 701 540
Source: Based on the Household survey, ECH, INE, Uruguay. Real hourly wages, base year 1997, are computed
for employees only and include bonuses.
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4.1.2 Methodology
To obtain a measure of wage discrimination, I first estimate male and female wage
equations separately. I then decompose the total gender wage gap following Oaxaca (1973)
and Blinder (1973), and retrieve the part of the wage gap that is due to differences in
the treatment of individuals with identical productive characteristics. For each year t and
sector j:
lnWmjt = X ′mjtβmjt + mjt
lnWfjt = X ′fjtβfjt + mjt
where lnWgjt is the logarithm of the hourly wage rate for a worker of gender g ∈ {f,m},
working in sector j during year t. The vector of individual characteristics, X, includes
the number of years of education, potential experience (age minus 6 minus the number of
years of education) and its square, and a dummy for the individual living in Montevideo
to control for wage differences between the capital and other urban areas.14 Estimating
the wage gap for private-sector employees only does not change the results. Arguments
can be made for the inclusion or exclusion of occupational controls. I here consider that
human-capital characteristics should determine the job position, hence I do not control for
occupation.15 Male and female wage equations are estimated separately for each year and
2-digit manufacturing sector, so that the returns to characteristics vary by sector and over
14Potential experience might however be only a poor proxy for actual experience. More importantly,
for our purpose, the gap between potential and actual experience is certainly larger for women, who have
both more and longer career interruptions, mainly due to maternity leave. Any gender difference in actual
experience which is not captured by potential experience would lead to the overestimation of the wage
gap due to unequal treatment, as shown by Wright and Ermisch (1991) for Britain. Unfortunately, the
unemployment-duration and job-tenure variables are missing for many years in our data, preventing us
from calculating real experience on the labour market.
15Controlling for occupation increases the share of the wage gap resulting from differences in coefficients,
especially at the beginning of the period in the following industries: food, machinery, paper and printing, and
chemicals. This comes from bigger differences in the returns to education within occupation as compared
to the mean difference when occupation is not controlled for.
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time. I include sectors for which there are enough female and male observations, namely
the food and beverage industry, the machinery industry, the chemicals industry, the paper
and printing industry, and the textile, apparel and leather industry.
The following wage decomposition is then calculated for each year t and sector j:
lnWmj − lnW fj = (Xmj −Xfj)β̂mj +X ′fj(β̂mj − β̂fj) (10)
where lnW gj denotes the mean log wage for group g in sector j, Xgj denotes the average
level of characteristics of group g in sector j and β̂gj the estimated parameter from the
wage equation. The total wage difference is decomposed into two terms. The first term on
the right-hand side captures the “endowment effect”, i.e. the part of the wage gap due to
differences in worker characteristics. The second term reflects the “coefficient effect”, i.e.
the differences in returns to similar characteristics. It is also referred to as the adjusted
wage gap (WG) and is subsequently used as a measure of wage discrimination:
ŴGjt = Xfjt(β̂mjt − β̂fjt)
Table 2 provides the female share, the raw gender wage gap and the adjusted gender
wage gap for the whole economy, the manufacturing sector at the 1-digit level and each
2-digit manufacturing sector for every second year in the 1990s.
Overall, both the raw wage gap and the adjusted wage gap fell in the early 1990s when
the Mercosur was first introduced, and fell further in the mid-1990s, corresponding to a
period of consolidation of the trade agreement. The rise in the wage gap over the early
2000s is concomitant with the Uruguayan banking and currency crisis. Table 2 also reveals
that the adjusted wage gap is always bigger than the raw wage gap. Between 1990 and 2002,
the raw gender wage gap range from 26% to 11% while the gender wage differential due to
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differences in returns ranges from 29% to 21% on average in the whole economy.16 A higher
adjusted wage gap compared to the raw wage gap means that differences in productive
characteristics such as human capital between men and women do not help explain the
raw wage gap. In fact, Table 1 shows that women have higher levels of education than
that of men. The differences in returns to characteristics are here the only source of gender
differences in wages.
Looking at sectoral variation, both the raw wage gap and the adjusted wage gap are
substantially larger in the manufacturing sector. At the beginning of the period, the wages
of men were over double those of women, with the gap being unexplained by differences
in characteristics. During the first half of the 2000s, the raw wage gap was around 25%
and remained unexplained by observable characteristics. Despite the fact that the wage
gap has fallen in all manufacturing sectors, there remains substantial sectoral variation.
Gaps are higher in the textile and garment industry, followed by the food, beverage and
tobacco industry, where the female shares of employment are the highest. In the Machine
and Equipment sector, the raw and the adjusted wage gaps are particularly low; this is
also the sector for which the wage gap is less precisely estimated due to a small number of
observations.
16Other research find similar magnitudes for the adjusted wage gap. For example, Nopo et al. (2010)
estimate the wage gap with a non-parametric matching approach, and find that in 2005 around 20% of the
gap could not be explained by returns on characteristics which is close to the estimate I have for 2002.
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Table 2: Gender Employment and Wage Gaps
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Whole Female share 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.44 0.45 0.46 0.48
economy Raw Wage Gap 0.23 0.19 0.18 0.14 0.14 0.11 0.04
lnWm − lnWf (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Wage Gap 0.26 0.27 0.25 0.23 0.20 0.19 0.13
Xf (β̂m − β̂f ) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Manufacturing Female share 0.33 0.33 0.30 0.30 0.31 0.32 0.31
sector Raw Wage Gap 0.40 0.35 0.36 0.34 0.24 0.22 0.27
lnWm − lnWf (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Wage Gap 0.44 0.40 0.41 0.40 0.26 0.29 0.30
Xf (β̂m − β̂f ) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Food Female share 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.31 0.31 0.28
Beverage Raw Wage Gap 0.22 0.27 0.31 0.29 0.33 0.23 0.24
lnWm − lnWf (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Wage Gap 0.25 0.33 0.51 0.35 0.30 0.33 0.36
Xf (β̂m − β̂f ) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07)
Textile Female share 0.60 0.62 0.59 0.60 0.56 0.55 0.61
Garment Raw Wage Gap 0.67 0.54 0.54 0.58 0.40 0.41 0.60
lnWm − lnWf (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.08)
Wage Gap 0.72 0.54 0.52 0.63 0.40 0.38 0.58
Xf (β̂m − β̂f ) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.15)
Chemicals Female share 0.25 0.27 0.28 0.29 0.31 0.30 0.34
Plastic Raw Wage Gap 0.16 0.06 0.15 0.12 0.11 0.22 0.09
lnWm − lnWf (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11)
Wage Gap 0.28 0.15 0.24 0.22 0.09 0.29 0.18
Xf (β̂m − β̂f ) (0.10) (0.13) (0.10) (0.09) (0.11) (0.08) (0.11)
Machines Female share 0.12 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.10 0.16 0.15
Raw Wage Gap 0.01 0.06 -0.12 0.08 0.06 -0.02 0.16
lnWm − lnWf (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.11) (0.12) (0.21)
Wage Gap -0.03 0.01 -0.20 0.02 -0.11 0.04 0.27
Xf (β̂m − β̂f ) (0.14) (0.31) (0.18) (0.10) (0.28) (0.12) (0.37)
Paper Female share 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.31 0.24 0.38 0.30
Printing Raw Wage Gap 0.02 0.15 0.37 0.35 0.05 0.12 0.22
lnWm − lnWf (0.09) (0.10) (0.12) (0.13) (0.15) (0.10) (0.13)
Wage Gap 0.21 0.17 0.41 0.31 0.20 0.19 0.40
Xf (β̂m − β̂f ) (0.16) (0.12) (0.14) (0.23) (0.19) (0.11) (0.19)
Source: Author’s calculations based on the Encuesta Continua de Hogares, INE, Uruguay. Wages
include bonuses. The raw and adjusted wage gaps are expressed in logarithm. The wage difference in
percentage points is (exp(wage gap) − 1) × 100. The wage gaps are calculated for sectors that have
enough observations per year. Because there are too few women, I cannot estimate the gaps in three
2-digit manufacturing sectors: Wood and Products of Wood, Non-Metallic Mineral Products and Basic
Metal Industries.
4.2 The measure of domestic competition
As proxy for industry competition, I use the Herfindahl index calculated as Cjt =∑N
e s
2
ejt, where sejt is firm e’s share of production in industry j and year t. The index values
range from 1, for a monopoly, to 1N if firms have equal market shares. The concentration
index is computed based on a firm surveys from the National Statistics Institute (INE),
the Encuesta Industrial Anual for 1988-1996 and the Encuesta de Actividad Económica for
1998-2003. Data for 1997 are taken from the Economic Census.17 Table 3 presents the
summary statistics for the sectoral concentration of market shares at the two-digit level.
Even at this fairly aggregated level, the index varies widely across sector and over time.
The most concentrated sector in the early 1980s was the paper industry, while in 2000, the
food and beverages industry and the machinery industry were the most concentrated.
Table 3: The Herfindahl index of production concentration in manufacturing industries
Year 1983-87 1990 1991 1994 1995 2000
Textile&Garment 18 22 23 28 27 15
Chemicals&Plastic 28 24 26 29 30 58
Machines 29 14 12 16 20 30
Food&Beverage 33 22 25 29 28 49
Paper&Printing 39 32 30 41 43 32
Source: INE, Uruguay. Cjt =
∑N
e
s2ejt, where sejt is firm e’s share of production in industry j and year t.
4.3 The measures of market access
Uruguay experienced considerable trade liberalisation in the 1990s. A number of liber-
alisation agreements were implemented, at the regional level with the founding of Mercosur
in 1991 and its amendment in December 1994, and at the multilateral level with the GATT
17I am grateful to Carlos Casacuberta for his help with the data on Herfindhal indexes.
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and WTO. The 1990s differ from the previous decades during which sectors were protected
by tariffs. Figure 2 shows how the level and the dispersion of Uruguay’s MFN tariffs have
fallen across five 2-digit sectors. At the end of 1990s, the MFN tariffs increased again as
Mercosur members agreed in December 1997 to increase temporarily their common exter-
nal tariff by 3 percentage points. The reduction in tariffs resumed after 2000. Uruguay
is a small open economy whose export and import shares have been rising as depicted in
Figure 2. Besides having comparative advantage in sectors which intensively use natural
resources, such as food-processing, textile and leather, Uruguay competes also internation-
ally in modern manufacturing sectors.
4.3.1 Methodology
I use market potentials as defined in economic geography models to measure the market-
size effect and the competition effect of trade integration on gender wage gaps. I prefer
market potential measures over trade shares for two reasons. First, market potentials use
information on the economic mechanism that the model presented in Section 2 intends to
stress. The model shows that the effect of trade liberalisation on the gender wage gap
depends on discriminatory firms’ ability to make profits at home and abroad which in
turn depends on trade costs to penetrate the domestic and the foreign markets and the
level of competition in those markets. Similarly, New Economic Geography (NEG) models
formalize a causal relationship between wages and market potential as the latter determines
the level of profit that can be shared with employees (Fujita et al., 1999). Second, it is
possible to construct market potential measures that are exogenous to local characteristics,
as explained below.
The first step consists in computing market potentials is to estimate a gravity equation
for each sector j and year t (Fally et al., 2010; Hering and Poncet, 2010).
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Figure 1: Export share, import penetration and tariff
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Total sales from country D to country F are expressed as:
lnXDFjt =
∑
kt
βkjtτk,DFjt + FXDjt + FMFjt + DFjt (11)
where XDFjt is the flow of good j from country D to country F in year t. The variable
FXDjt is an exporter fixed effect which is sector-country-year specific: this captures char-
acteristics such as the number of firms and the average cost of production. Analogously,
the importer fixed effect FMFjt captures characteristics particular to each sector of the
importing country in a given year. The vector τk,DFjt includes k variables of the trade costs
of entering market F . I use bilateral distance, contiguity and common language that vary
across trade partners, and regional trade agreements that vary across trade partners and
years. Tariffs additionally provide variation in trade costs across both sectors and years. I
have access to tariff information at the sector level only from 1991. Thus I construct two
MA variables, one without tariffs for 1983-2003, and another with sectoral tariff for 1991-
2003. Note however that the benchmark MA calculated for 1983-2003 without sectoral
tariff does vary across sector and time even if distance and language do not. The gravity
equation is estimated separately for each sector j and year t so that it allows the effect of
distance and language to vary across sectors and time. For instance, distance represents
a bigger trade barrier for perishable products than non-perishable ones but the effect of
distance may be reduced over time as technological progress reduces transportation time.
In a second step, I use the estimated coefficients of Equation (11) to compute Uruguay’s
market access (MA) and foreign competitors access to the Uruguay market (CA) at the sec-
tor level. The market access of Uruguayan firms exporting good j is denoted by M̂AURY,jt
and captures the market-size effect of trade. It is the sum of the market accesses to all of
Uruguay’s trade partners F . In this case, Uruguay is the exporter country D and the trade
partners are the importer countries F . Uruguayan firms’ access to market F depends on
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the costs to enter this market τk,URY,Fjt and on the size of the demand and the level of
competition in the foreign market F captured by the importer fixed-effects F̂MFjt.
M̂AURY jt =
∑
F
M̂AURY,Fjt =
∑
F
(
F̂MFjt
∏
k
(τk,URY,Fjt)β̂kt
)
Note that the characteristics of the Uruguayan sector are not included in theMA variable,
but they are controlled for in the gravity equation (11). By excluding the sector-year-
specific exporter fixed-effect FXURY,j,t, I ensure that this measure is exogenous to all
domestic factors that affect the sector’s export supply capacity, such as its competitive
advantage or changes in the labour supply. In particular, I eliminate the concern of reverse
causality between a sector’s gender wage gap and its export shares as it may be argued that
a reduction in the gender wage gap reduces labour costs and thus increases competitiveness
and exports.
Foreign firms’ access to Uruguay is denoted by CAjt and captures the pro-competitive
effect of trade. It is the sum of all of trade partners’ access to the Uruguayan market. In this
case, Uruguay is the importer country F and the trade partners are the exporter countryD.
The competitors’ access depends on the costs to enter the Uruguayan market τk,F,URY,jt
and on the competitive advantage of competitors captured by the exporter fixed-effects
F̂XFjt.
ĈAURY jt =
∑
F
ĈAF,URY jt =
∑
F
(
F̂XF,jt
∏
k
(τk,F,URY jt)β̂kt
)
Note that the characteristics of the Uruguayan sector are not included in the CA variable,
but they are controlled for in the gravity equation (11). By excluding the sector-year-
specific importer fixed-effect FMURY,j,t, I ensure that the CA measure is exogenous to all
domestic factors that affect import penetration. Again, this measure is free from concerns
of reverse causality between the gender wage gap of a sector and the import shares of
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that sector. In this case, reverse causality would imply that a fall in the gender wage gap
reduces the entry of foreign goods by reducing labour costs and increasing Uruguayan firms
competitiveness.
4.3.2 Trade data
To compute the market access and competitor access measures, I use bilateral trade and
production data from the TradeProd database from the CEPII (Mayer et al., 2008). CEPII
also provides the Distances database with bilateral distances and common official language,
which are used to capture part of trade costs. As additional information on trade costs I
use Uruguayan MFN tariffs at the 2-digit sector level from the Latin American Integration
Association (LAIA).18
Figure 2 depicts the evolution of the estimated market access variables ĈA and M̂A in
five manufacturing sectors.19 Both variables rose in the 1990s in the Food and Beverage
industry, Chemicals Products industry, Machines and Equipments industry. In the Textile
and Garment industry Uruguay’s market access remained constant while ĈA slightly de-
creased. Most sectors suffered from a fall in M̂A in the late 1990s, reflecting the crisis in
neighboring countries. The financial crisis began in 1999 in Argentina, spread to Uruguay
and persisted in the region until the early 2000s.
18I am grateful to Carlos Casacuberta for sharing with me data on MFN tariffs.
19The choice of the manufacturing sectors is dictated by the size of the survey data ECH that does
not provide enough observations to estimate yearly wage gaps and extent the analysis to the other 2-digit
sectors i.e. Wood and Products of Wood, Non-Metallic Mineral Products and Basic Metal Industries.
34
Figure 2: Market Access
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4.4 Empirical specification
To identify empirically the heterogeneous effects of trade openness, I employ the fol-
lowing specification:
ŴGjt = β0 + β1 ln M̂Ajt−1 + β2 lnCj0 ln M̂Ajt−1
+β3 ln ĈAjt−1 + β4 lnCj0 ln ĈAjt−1 + θt + µj + jt (12)
where ŴGjt is the estimated adjusted gender wage gap at time t.20 M̂Ajt−1 captures the
profit opportunities in foreign market j at time t− 1, ĈAjt−1 captures foreign competitive
pressure due to the entry of foreign products, Cj0 is the level of concentration of sector
j in the first period, θt is a vector of year fixed-effects, and µj is a vector of industry
fixed-effects. The first-period level of sectoral concentration Cj0 is picked up by the sector
fixed-effects.
Gender wage gaps may vary across sectors for reasons that have nothing to do with
competition. Sector fixed-effects net out any impact of time-invariant industry-specific
factors such as social norms regarding female employment (which may be less accepted in
machinery or oil industries than in textile and garment). The year fixed-effects capture
shocks or policies affecting labour-market conditions equally across all manufacturing sec-
tors. These include, for example, macroeconomic shocks such as the financial crisis in the
early 2000s or government policies which influence female labour supply such as childcare
or parental-leave reforms. The effect of trade openness is identified from within-industry
changes. In some specification, I also control for past concentration levels Cj,t−1 to capture
20Given that the dependent variable is estimated for each year and sector in the first stage, the point
estimates are affected by sampling variation. To correct for heteroscedasticity, I estimate this specification
by weighted least squares, where the weights are the inverse of the standard errors from the estimation of
the gender wage gaps.
36
differences in ability to discriminate across sectors with different market power. I also add
the share of women in the sector FLSjt−1 to control for the effect of female concentration
on female relative wages. Section 5.2 addresses further endogeneity concerns.
5 Empirical results
5.1 Market access, competitors acces and the gender wage gap
Table 4 shows the results from the estimation of equation (12) for the period 1983-2003.
Columns (1) to (4) show the results with MA and CA computed on for all Uruguayan trade
partners, while columns (5) to (8) show results with MA and CA computed on the set of
Mercosur members only (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay). Columns (4) and
(8) additionally account for the sector concentration level lnCj,t−1 and the sector female
labour share lnFLSj,t−1.
In columns (1),(2), (5) and (6) the wage gap is explained by either CA orMA. However,
all sectors exhibit two-way trade within Mercosur, firms in the same sector enjoyed new
market opportunities and, at the same time, had to deal with new product entry from their
trade partners. As the two phenomena have opposing effects on the ability to discriminate,
I also control for both in the same regression.
The effect of foreign competition lnCAj,t−1 is associated with a higher adjusted wage
gap in non-concentrated sectors. The point estimate here reveals the impact of competitors’
access in sectors with an initial Herfindahl index of zero (i.e. sectors with a very large
number of firms), which does not correspond to the oligopolistic framework developed in
the model. The model developed in Section 2 cannot explain why a jump in the entry
of foreign goods would be positively associated with the wage gap in sectors with a large
number of firms.21
21A similar result pertains in Black and Brainerd (2004) in their regression of the gender wage gap on
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Table 4: Market Access and the Gender Wage Gap.
1983-2003
Dependent variable: Adjusted wage gap
All trade partners Mercosur trade partners
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
lnCAj,t−1 0.790* 1.344*** 1.559*** 0.970** 0.911*** 0.953***
(0.338) (0.264) (0.214) (0.294) (0.187) (0.197)
lnCAj,t−1× lnC0 -0.218* -0.365*** -0.428*** -0.272** -0.246*** -0.260***
(0.099) (0.074) (0.058) (0.083) (0.051) (0.056)
lnMAj,t−1 -0.420* -0.796*** -0.776*** -0.498*** -0.337* -0.289*
(0.163) (0.088) (0.130) (0.089) (0.123) (0.109)
lnMAj,t−1× lnC0 0.122* 0.205*** 0.199*** 0.141** 0.077 0.066
(0.055) (0.023) (0.030) (0.031) (0.047) (0.042)
lnCj,t−1 0.164*** 0.114**
(0.029) (0.036)
lnFLSj,t−1 0.148 0.089
(0.110) (0.160)
Observations 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96
R-squared 0.222 0.177 0.303 0.363 0.262 0.216 0.315 0.343
Note: All regressions include year and 2-digit sector fixed-effects. Weighted least squares regressions where the
weights equal the inverse of the standard errors in the gender wage gap estimation. C0 is the average value of the
Herfindahl index for 1983-1985. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5: Market Access and the Gender Wage Gap.
1991-2003
Dependent variable: Adjusted wage gap
All trade partners Mercosur trade partners
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
lnCAj,t−1 0.768*** 1.567** 1.453*** 0.866*** 1.326** 1.284***
(0.156) (0.426) (0.300) (0.158) (0.294) (0.241)
lnCAj,t−1× lnC0 -0.236*** -0.474** -0.443** -0.263*** -0.401** -0.393***
(0.049) (0.138) (0.099) (0.048) (0.097) (0.076)
lnMAj,t−1 -0.010 -0.845** -0.880** -0.180 -0.619** -0.701***
(0.104) (0.279) (0.211) (0.130) (0.191) (0.138)
lnMAj,t−1× lnC0 -0.003 0.248* 0.263** 0.048 0.182* 0.212**
(0.029) (0.093) (0.075) (0.041) (0.067) (0.049)
lnCj,t−1 0.089 0.076
(0.057) (0.067)
lnFLSj,t−1 -0.081 -0.122
(0.159) (0.159)
Observations 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60
R-squared 0.320 0.272 0.391 0.418 0.341 0.284 0.420 0.442
Note: All regressions include year and 2-digit sector fixed-effects. Weighted least squares regressions where the weights
equal the inverse of the standard errors in the gender wage gap estimation. C0 is the average value of the Herfindahl
index for 1990-1991. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The main coefficient of interest for the test of taste discrimination is the interaction of
foreign competition (CA) with domestic concentration. This interaction lnCAj,t−1× lnCj,0
consistently attracts a negative estimated coefficient: in concentrated sectors, the wage gap
falls as firms face new competitive forces due to the easier entry of foreign products. This
effect can be interpreted as the result of less market power, which employers previously
used to discriminate against women.
I now turn to the effect of export potential, measured here by Uruguayan firms’ access
to foreign markets (MA). The negative and significant coefficient on lnMAj,t−1 reveals that
in sectors with low concentration, export potential does not translate into a greater ability
import penetration.
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to discriminate but on the contrary help reduce the gender wage gap. This is consistent
with the model prediction on the effect of trade integration in sectors with a large number
of firms prior liberalisation. Only the most-productive non-discriminatory firms export.
The expansion of those firms make it harder for discriminatory firms to break even in their
own domestic market, which explains the lower gender wage gap.
Second, the positive and significant coefficient on lnMA_j, t− 1× lnCj,0 reveals that,
in concentrated sectors, better sales opportunities abroad increase the adjusted wage gap.
Here the “extensive-margin effect” dominates: less-productive discriminatory firms can
now enter foreign markets and earn profits abroad that discriminatory employers may use
to pay men a premium.
5.2 Alternative channels and identification threats
In this section, I explore alternative channels that may be driving the results. Note
that any alternative story would have to explain i) the fall in the gender wage gap in
concentrated sectors with an increase in competitors access to the Uruguayan market, ii)
the fall in the gender wage gap in competitive sectors with an increase in export potentials
and iii) the increase in the gender wage gap in concentrated sectors with an increase in
export potentials.
It is possible that trade liberalisation affects the returns to unobserved skills such as the
field of study or foreign language skills. Unobserved skills may affect the gender wage gap
and be correlated with trade liberalisation. However, the change in returns to those skills
with trade integration should not depend on the level of production concentration of a
sector. Unobserved skills are thus unlikely to drive the results. Even so, to account for the
potential differences in male and female unobserved skills across sectors I adopt an approach
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used by Glaeser and Maré (2001) and Fallah et al. (2011) who argue that unmeasured ability
is highly correlated with measured ability such as occupation and educational attainment.
I control for the average female skill shares (FSLSj,t−1) and male skill shares (MSLSj,t−1)
at the sector level as well as the female and male shares of skilled white collars at the
sector level (FWCj,t−1 and MWCj,t−1). When I include these controls to the benchmark
model in columns (1), (2), (5) and (6) of Table 6, the coefficients of market potential and
its interaction with concentration are only moderately affected, which adds confidence that
gender differences in unobserved skills correlated with trade integration are not driving the
results.
If certain skills are unobserved to the econometrician, some skills are also unobserved
by the employer, creating scope for an alternative source of gender wage gap: statistical
discrimination. In statistical discrimination models, employers are imperfectly informed
about some characteristics of the individuals that are relevant for their productivity. The
absence of perfect knowledge motivates employers to use group statistics as proxies of
these unobserved characteristics. Uncertainty about labour market attachment is the most
common source of gender discrimination as women work on average fewer hours than
men and are more likely to interrupt their participation to the labour market. In fact,
Goldin (2014) documents that the gender wage gap tends to be largest in jobs where
the returns associated with working long hours are the biggest. Many models of have
shown that trade liberalisation increases the demand for skills but what about unobserved
characteristics that strongly differs across gender? In a statistical discrimination setting,
Ben Yahmed (2012) shows that trade liberalisation can increase the gender wage gap among
skilled workers in tradable sectors if job commitment, as well as skills, are complement
to technological upgrading. However, this mechanism would not explain why the effect
of trade liberalisation differs across concentrated vs. non-concentrated sectors. Still, I
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Table 6: Market Access and the Gender Wage Gap.
Dependent variable: Adjusted wage gap
1983-2013 1991-2013
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
lnCAj,t−1 1.537*** 1.567*** 1.569*** 1.501*** 1.555** 1.539** 1.527*** 1.483**
(0.212) (0.224) (0.208) (0.191) (0.347) (0.376) (0.331) (0.369)
lnCAj,t−1× lnC0 -0.420*** -0.429*** -0.430*** -0.408*** -0.474** -0.469** -0.466** -0.452**
(0.058) (0.062) (0.058) (0.051) (0.111) (0.122) (0.108) (0.121)
lnMAj,t−1 -0.719*** -0.773*** -0.770*** -0.664** -0.962** -0.954** -0.933** -0.912**
(0.110) (0.127) (0.149) (0.229) (0.295) (0.284) (0.221) (0.292)
lnMAj,t−1× lnC0 0.179*** 0.195*** 0.197*** 0.160* 0.288** 0.286** 0.280** 0.274*
(0.025) (0.032) (0.036) (0.068) (0.096) (0.094) (0.077) (0.100)
lnCj,t−1 0.179** 0.178*** 0.159*** 0.131** 0.101 0.099* 0.083 0.081
(0.039) (0.036) (0.027) (0.029) (0.050) (0.043) (0.061) (0.051)
lnFLSj,t−1 0.154 0.154 0.117 0.131 -0.079 -0.082 -0.101 -0.110
(0.127) (0.124) (0.114) (0.090) (0.175) (0.180) (0.166) (0.185)
lnMSLSj,t−1 0.112 0.075
(0.073) (0.086)
lnFSLSj,t−1 -0.050 0.006
(0.029) (0.051)
lnFWCSj,t−1 -0.181 0.096
(0.314) (0.426)
lnMWCSj,t−1 0.116 0.075
(0.068) (0.087)
Male overworkj,t−1 0.271 0.183
(0.301) (0.362)
Min wagej,t−1 0.897 -0.262
(0.952) (0.697)
lnFLS× Min wagej,t−1 -0.545 0.695
(0.774) (0.996)
Observations 96 96 96 96 60 60 60 60
R-squared 0.378 0.374 0.366 0.378 0.426 0.428 0.420 0.419
All regressions include year and 2-digit sector fixed-effects. Weighted least squares regressions where the weights equal
the inverse of the standard errors in the gender wage gap estimation. C0 is the average value of the Herfindahl index
for 1983-1985 in columns (1) to (4) and for 1990-1991 in columns (5) to (8). Standard errors in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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control for the sector-specific share of male workers working more than 45 hours a week to
capture sectoral differences in the probability to discriminate because of the use of overtime
and lower working hours among women on average. Note that overall increase in female
labour market attachment over the 1990s that would be correlated with Uruguayan trade
liberalisation is netted out be year fixed-effects. Columns (3) and (7) in Table 6 show that
a higher share of male employees working long hours in a sector is positively correlated
with the gender wage gap in that sector although not significantly so. The effect of market
access does not change. Further interactions of the share of overtime with market access
measures are not significant and do not affect the coefficients of the main variables of
interest.
Finally, institutional factors can shape the distribution of female and male wages in
different ways. In particular, minimum wages can reduce the gender wage gap at the bottom
of the wage distribution as women are more likely to receive lower pay compared to men.
Given that sectors have different shares of workers affected by minimum wage regulation,
and that the minimum wage changes over time, the effect of the minimum wage on the
gender wage gap could be correlated with changes in sectors’ market potentials. Columns
(4) and (8) Table 6 control for the share of employees earning the hourly minimum wage
at the sector level and its interaction with the female labour share of the sector. Again,
the effects of market access and competitors access, and how they depend on the level of
concentration of a sector, are robust to the addition of these controls.
6 Conclusion
This paper has developed a model of wage discrimination with intra-industry trade to
highlight the possible channels through which trade openness affects the wage gap resulting
from employers’ prejudice against women. As far as I know, this is the first theoretical
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model where both the wage gap and the patterns of trade are endogenously determined.
The model formalises the pro-competitive effect of trade on the wage gap, but also high-
lights the potential profit-enhancing effect of trade openness on the gender wage gap, and
by doing so explains otherwise puzzling results.
Trade openness can have more than one effect on the ability to discriminate. First, trade
liberalisation makes it easier for foreign firms to enter the domestic market, yielding tougher
foreign competition at home. This drives down oligopoly profits, reduces production by
high-cost discriminatory firms, and may even force them to close down. This selection of
firms reduces the gender wage gap.
Second, the liberalisation of trade partners’ markets can have two opposite effects. If
domestic firms have a competitive advantage over foreign firms, and competition among
domestic firms is not too fierce, trade liberalisation enables less-productive firms to enter
foreign markets by reducing the cost of exporting. This boosts domestic firms’ rents instead
of exerting a pro-competitive effect. In other words, trade liberalisation makes it easier
for prejudiced employers to employ and pay workers according to their preferences. This
market-size effect dominates if the number of competitors is small enough. However, if
discriminatory firms are not able to sustain their cost disadvantage abroad, better export
opportunities benefit only the most-productive domestic firms which increase their demand
for female labour, and thus reduce the wage gap. This selection effect dominates when the
number of firms is large enough.
To provide some empirical evidence for these mechanisms, I take advantage of the
considerable liberalisation that took place in Uruguay following the creation of Mercosur
in 1991, and its consolidation in 1995. Uruguay is an interesting country for which to
explore the impact of market access, as it is a small economy which is less likely to influence
the outcome of trade-agreement negotiations. This ensures the exogeneity of changes in
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trade policies with respect to domestic-industry characteristics. To provide a measure of
the pattern of competitive advantage between trade partners, I compute market-access
variables that are exogenous to local characteristics and are closer to the theory compared
to trade shares.
The main theoretical predictions are supported by the empirical findings. Foreign
competition curbs the adjusted wage gap in sectors which were previously sheltered from
competition. On the contrary, the profit opportunities from exports increase the adjusted
wage gap when domestic concentration is high, but not when concentration is low. However,
while competition can reduce the unexplained wage gap, it does not remove it completely.
In particular, the remaining wage gap in fairly competitive sectors is positively affected by
an increase in foreign firms’ access to the domestic market. This empirical result remains
a puzzle and calls for further investigation.
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Appendix
A Conditions for an interior solution for firm production
levels
The output of firm i depends on ci its own cost, N the number of competitors, c˜−i the
average cost of its competitors and b the size of demand :
qi =
b− ci + (N − 1)(c˜−i − ci)
N + 1
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Firms employing men have the highest unit cost and thus the lowest output. They are
the first to cease production as competitive pressure heightens. In what follows, we derive
the conditions for an interior solution for discriminatory firms. As non-discriminatory firms
have lower costs, they will necessarily produce if discriminatory firms produce. In the case
where no discriminatory firm can survive, there is no wage gap and I derive the condition
for N identical firms incurring a unit labour cost.
A.1 The Closed-Economy Case
Discriminatory firms pay a wage wf + d∗ to their male employees. They produce a
positive amount qm if:
qm > 0⇔ b > wf + d∗ + Nfd
∗
2
where d∗ = dNf dN−1 and Nf
d∗
2 is the cost disadvantage of discriminatory firms (that hire
men) compared to non-discriminatory firms (tose that hire women). High wage gaps are
sustainable in markets with large enough demand. The greater the number of firms, the
higher the demand b needed for discriminatory firms to sustain their cost disadvantage.
If all women are hired by the non-prejudiced employer, there is no cost difference
between male and female firms, d∗ = 0 and wf = wm = w. All firms produce the same
amount q = b−wN+1 and an interior solution requires that demand be large enough:
q > 0⇔ b > w
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A.2 The Open-Economy Case
In the open-economy setting, domestic firms can either produce locally and export to
foreign markets, produce only for the domestic market, or cease production altogether.
Given the separation of markets, I examine all posible situations sequentially.
Are discriminatory firms able to export?
qmDF > 0⇔ bF > τF (wf + d∗ + Nfd
∗
2 ) +NF (τF (wf + d
∗)− cF )
with τFNf d
∗
2 being the cost disadvantage of domestic discriminatory compared to non-
discriminatory firms, and τF (wf + d∗)− cF the cost difference between domestic discrimi-
natory and foreign firms.
If discriminatory firms have a susbtantial competitive advantage over foreign firms
cF > τF (wf + d∗) + S, they are then able to export to F . τF (wf + d∗) here represents
the production cost to export and S = τFNF (wf + d
∗(1 + Nf2 )) reflects the cost disadvantage
generated by discrimination. Discriminatory firms need to compensate for their higher
costs compared to non-discriminatory domestic firms that export to the foreign market.
If discriminatory firms do not have a competitive advantage, they are able to ex-
port to market F only if few foreign firms NF operate in the destination market F . If
τF (wf + d∗) + S > cF , then qmDF > 0 if NF <
bF−τF (wf+d∗(1+
Nf
2 ))
τF (wf+d∗)−cF
Are non-discriminatory domestic firms able to export?
If discriminatory firms are not competitive enough and foreign firms NF are too nu-
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merous, the former do not export. We then need to see whether non-discriminatory firms
are able to enter the foreign market. Non-discriminatory firms employ women but can be
prejudiced against women; this situation takes place whenever there is a positive wage gap
at home, and the discrepancy between male and female wages compensates the employer
for the discomfort of hiring women. The following condition thus depends on the prejudice
of each specific firm. For every firm i with di < d∗:
qiDF > 0⇔ bF > (NF + 1)(τF (wf + di)) + τFd∗(ND − Nf2 )−NF cF
A firm with female employees and an employer of prejudice di exports if cF > τF (wf +
di)+Si, with Si = τFNF (wf +di−d∗(ND+
Nf
2 )). The rationale behind the condition remains
the same: higher demand bF in market F makes it easier for domestic firms to export; the
cost advantage of domestic firms has to compensate for transport costs and the impact of
their prejudice di. Note that having positive exports is easier for less-prejudiced firms as
they perceive that they bear lower labour costs and are ready to hire more women: we can
see this as Si falls in di.
If cF < τF (w + di) + Si , then qiDF > 0⇔ NF < bF−τF (w+di)+d
∗(ND+
Nf
2 )
τF (w+di)−cF
A smaller number of competitors compensates for the absence of a strong competitive ad-
vantage over foreign firms.
Are discriminatory firms able to sell on the domestic market?
Discriminatory firms able to sell on the domestic market if:
qmDD > 0⇔ b > wf (NF + 1) + d∗(NF + 1 + Nf2 )− τDcFNF
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If wf (NF + 1) + d∗(NF + 1 + Nf2 ) < τDcFNF it is always the case that qmDD > 0.
However, if discriminatory domestic firms do not have a competitive advantage, then we
require that there be only few foreign firms willing to sell in the domestic market:
if wf (NF + 1) + d∗(NF + 1 + Nf2 ) > τDcFNF then qmDD > 0⇔ NF <
b−wf−d∗(1+
Nf
2 )
wf+d∗−τDcF
The Homogeneous-Firm Case
I consider the case where there is no cost difference between male-type and female-type
firms, wf = wm = w Are domestic firms able to export?
Domestic firms’ exports are qDF = bF−τFw+NF (cF−τFw)N+1 . They are positive if NF <
bF−τFw
τFw−cF .
Greater demand in market F makes it easier for domestic firms to export. On the other
hand, more foreign competitors makes it harder.
Are domestic firms able to sell on their market?
Sales at home are qDD = b−w+NF (τDcF−w)N+1 and they are positive if NF <
b−w
w−τDcF .
B Proofs of the existence and uniqueness of the wage gap d∗
The wage gap d∗ is defined by d = F (d). To make sure this equation has a solution, we
need to define the conditions under which the function F crosses the 45◦ line. As F falls
in d, we thus have to show that F (0) > 0 and F (d¯) < d¯.
First, F (0) = 2(Lf − Lm(N−1)) so that F (0) > 0 if Lf > LmN−1 . Second, F (d¯) < 0 so that
F (d¯) < d¯ for all d. Moreover F is strictly decreasing, F ′(d) < 0, which implies that F (d)
crosses the 45◦ line only once. Hence d∗ is unique.
To sum up, d = F (d) has a unique solution if Lf > LmN−1 , which requires that the female
labour force is not employed by one firm only. If Lf ≤ LmN−1 , the equilibrium wage gap
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equals the prejudice level of the least-prejudiced employer which is zero in this version of
the model.
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